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	 Since	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	War,	China	has	undergone	a	remarkable	 transformation.	Reaping	the	fruits	of	the	diplomatic	opening	and	economic	reforms	of	the	1970s	and	‘80s,	it	has	grown	steadily	from	an	isolated	and	economically	stunted	state	of	little	import	for	those	without	a	regional	interest	in	East	Asia	into	a	significant	economic	and	military	power	just	beginning	to	wield	its	influence	across	the	globe.	As	policymakers	and	international	relations	(IR)	pundits	have	turned	their	attention	to	the	dark	horse	flexing	its	newly	(re)gained	power,	their	primary	concern	is	forecasting	China’s	actions	in	international	society.	Their	analyses	and	prognostications	often	display	a	certain	subtle	but	tangible	anxiety	arising	from	the	fact	that	nobody	 is	certain	how	to	understand	China’s	 intentions	(see	 for	example	Manning	&	Przystup	2016,	Revere	2016	and	Shi	2015).		 In	trying	to	make	sense	of	the	the	East	Asian	giant’s	behavior,	academics	often	turn	to	culture	 as	 our	main	 explanatory	 tool.	 Culture	 shows	promise	because	 it	 is	 “fitted”	 to	 the	contours	of	the	puzzling	case,	showing	how	the	mass	of	contradictions	that	we	perceive	in	China’s	behavior	actually	make	sense	within	the	state’s	unique	cultural	climate.	The	turn	to	culture	 answers	 some	of	 the	 “how	possible”	questions	of	 foreign	policy	decision-making,	giving	us	a	prepackaged	variable	to	which	we	can	ascribe	puzzling	foreign	policy	choices.	In	China’s	case,	culture	is	typically	invoked	in	the	form	of	Confucianism,	a	system	of	social	and	political	thought	that	focuses	on	morality	and	appropriate	conduct	as	the	ordering	principle	of	a	stable	and	prosperous	society.	Unfortunately,	 when	 dealing	 with	 Chinese	 culture	 as	 an	 explanation	 for	 Chinese	behavior,	 it	 is	difficult	to	escape	binary	thinking	about	key	aspects	of	Chinese	culture	like	Confucian	 political	 thought.	 Some	 scholars	 like	 Morris	 Rossabi	 (1983),	 Scott	 Boorman	(1969),	and	Paul	Godwin	(1984)	highlight	the	quintessentially	Confucian	characteristics	of	
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Chinese	 foreign	 policy.	 These	 arguments	 focus	 primarily	 or	 exclusively	 on	 defensive	behaviors	and	the	restricted	use	of	military	force	at	various	points	in	Chinese	history,	which	they	attribute	to	a	Confucian	belief	system	essential	to	Chinese	culture.	Other	scholars	like	Denny	Roy	 (1994,	 1996),	Allen	Whiting	 (1983),	 and	Deng	Yong	&	Wang	Fei-Ling	 (2004)	emphasize	the	assertive	nature	of	Chinese	strategic	action	on	the	contemporary	world	stage.	Where	they	address	Confucianism	at	all,	 they	do	so	in	the	negative,	citing	the	Communist	Revolution	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 as	 the	 end	 of	 Confucianism’s	 influence	 on	 Chinese	foreign	policy.			 Even	scholars	like	Alastair	Iain	Johnston,	who	are	conscious	of	the	binary	and	strive	to	work	against	it,	struggle	to	escape	the	all-or-nothing	approach	to	Confucianism	in	Chinese	foreign	policy.	As	he	turns	to	the	Ming	Dynasty	strategic	canon	to	make	a	more	systematic	review	of	culture’s	influence	on	Chinese	strategic	choice,	Johnston	identifies	both	Confucian	and	 realpolitik	 elements	 in	 the	 security	 discourse.	However,	 although	he	notes	 that	 both	exist,	he	dismisses	 the	Confucian	elements	as	merely	symbolic	and	thus	 insignificant	 in	a	larger	theoretical	context.	By	minimizing	the	importance	of	Confucian	symbolic	vocabulary,	he	paints	a	picture	of	Chinese	behavior	as	monochromatically	realist,	largely	perpetuating	the	binary.		 Chinese	scholar	Liu	Tiewa	 is	 the	one	scholar	 I	have	 found	that	escapes	 the	 trap	of	cultural	reductionism.	Unlike	Johnston,	she	does	not	exclude	the	symbolic	out	of	hand.	This	allows	her	 to	 tell	a	 compelling	story	of	 subtle	variation	as	she	 traces	 the	development	of	Chinese	political	 thought	 from	 the	end	of	 the	 imperial	 through	Deng	Xiaoping’s	 rule.	 She	highlights	how	Chinese	strategic	combines	a	range	of	concepts	drawn	from	both	traditional	Chinese	 and	 Western	 sources.	 In	 her	 depiction	 of	 China’s	 culture	 of	 national	 security,	
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Confucian	thought	is	neither	the	single	most	defining	feature	of	Chinese	strategic	culture	nor	an	unimportant	 symbolic	 element	 that	 can	be	dismissed.	 She	uses	 this	 subtler	picture	of	dynamism	 to	 explain	 China’s	 vacillation	 between	 assertiveness	 and	 withdrawal	 on	 the	international	stage.		 Liu’s	astute	observations	give	scholars	tools	for	puzzling	out	the	mystery	of	China’s	intentions	without	 depicting	 Chinese	 culture	 as	monolithically	 Confucian	 or	 Realist.	 This	nuanced	view	is	vital	both	for	assessing	the	global	security	implications	of	China’s	rise	and	for	cleansing	our	 theories	of	 the	 trace	of	Orientalism	and	Red	Scare	 ideology	 that	plague	many	monolithic	conceptions	of	Chinese	culture.	However,	while	Liu’s	work	is	empirically	ingenious,	 it	 lacks	 a	 satisfying	 grounding	 in	 theory.	 This	 lack	 of	 a	 theoretical	 foundation	makes	it	difficult	to	apply	Liu’s	reasoning	the	particularities	of	20th	century	China	that	she	explicitly	addresses.	This	limits	the	usefulness	of	her	argument	in	making	sense	of	politics	moving	into	the	future.	In	this	paper,	I	take	the	nuance	and	dynamism	in	China’s	strategic	thought	 over	 time	 that	 Liu	 describes	 and	 provide	 a	 foundation	 for	 it	 by	 rooting	 it	 in	 a	discursive	theory	of	strategic	culture.		 Following	Lisa	Wedeen’s	(2002)	lead	in	conceiving	of	culture	as	“semiotic	practices,”	I	define	strategic	culture	as	a	system	of	signification	and	the	associated	practices	of	meaning-making	connected	with	a	society	or	state’s	security,	foreign	policy,	and	grand	strategy.	Most	previous	work	on	strategic	culture	like	Johnston’s	has	characterized	culture	as	internalized	preferences	and	causal	beliefs	about	the	nature	of	international	politics.	Johnston	takes	for	granted	 that	 these	 preferences	 and	 beliefs	 exist	 in	 the	world	 and	misses	 how	 the	 causal	relationships	 themselves	 are	 symbolically	 constituted	 and	 imbued	 with	 meaning.	 This	further	enables	a	one-dimensional	or	monolithic	view	of	that	culture	because	no	mechanism	
	 4	
of	 change	 is	 presented.	 By	 conceptualizing	 strategic	 culture	 as	 the	 semiotic	 practices	 of	security,	I	open	the	door	to	more	subtlety	and	dynamism.		 Security	 meaning-making	 practices	 are	 performed	 discursively	 as	 the	 society’s	various	 members	 discuss	 security,	 strategy,	 and	 foreign	 policy	 with	 each	 other.	 These	strategic	 discourses	 consist	 of	 two	 types	 of	 content.	 First	 is	 the	 causal	 content	 that	 the	strategic	culture	literature	has	traditionally	focused	on.	This	relates	concepts	such	as	specific	actors	 and	 policy	 actions	 to	 each	 other	 in	 a	web	 of	 cause	 and	 effect	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	evaluate	the	efficacy	of	a	given	policy	option.	However,	Wedeen’s	theory	of	culture	points	to	another	 aspect	 of	 these	 semiotic	 practices	 that	 the	 literature	 largely	 ignores,	 namely	 the	constitutive	content.	This	content	defines	the	boundaries	and	characteristics	of	the	concepts	in	the	causal	web.	I	will	argue	that	both	aspects	of	security	meaning-making	are	important	for	understanding	the	way	a	society’s	culture	plays	into	its	foreign	policy.		 In	order	to	capture	both	these	components	of	strategic	cultural	discourse,	I	turn	to	a	technique	called	predicate	analysis	(see	Milliken	1999),	which	uses	the	syntactic	structure	universal	to	natural	languages	to	map	the	contours	of	concepts	as	they	relate	to	one	another.	Whereas	Johnston’s	method	of	cognitive	mapping	focuses	on	the	causal	 linkages	between	concepts	whose	connotations	are	assumed	to	be	self-evident,	predicate	analysis	dissects	the	referenced	concepts’	meanings.	 I	 apply	 this	 technique	 to	 the	strategic	 cultural	discourses	under	Deng	Xiaoping	and	Mao	Zedong,	using	the	juxtaposition	to	illustrate	the	shifts	that	Liu	identifies	in	her	study.	I	then	focus	in	particular	on	the	changing	appearance	and	significance	of	one	particular	concept:	the	moral	man	in	politics.	The	anatomy	of	this	particular	element	underlines	Confucianism’s	ambiguous	role	and	calls	into	question	the	validity	of	monolithic	models	of	Chinese	strategic	culture	by	highlighting	 its	capacity	 for	and	history	of	marked	
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changes	over	time.	This	necessitates	a	more	nuanced	reflection	on	Confucianism’s	role	 in	China’s	foreign	policy	today.		 Apart	from	validating	Liu	Tiewa’s	observations	about	20th	century	Chinese	strategic	culture,	 the	 theory	 of	 strategic	 culture	 developed	 here	 sheds	 light	 on	 contemporary	 and	future	Chinese	foreign	policy.	The	predicate	analysis	methodology	need	not	only	be	applied	to	historical	texts	but	can	also	be	used	to	analyze	ongoing	security	discourse	in	China.	This	allows	us	 to	 actually	 observe	 the	 shifts	 in	 strategic	 culture	 as	 they	 occur.	By	monitoring	changes	in	China’s	security	discourse	as	they	unfold,	scholars	and	policy	pundits	can	glean	an	immediately	relevant	understanding	of	the	strategic	priorities	and	limits	of	possibility	in	China’s	discourse	of	national	security.	This	may	not	be	able	to	answer	Johnston’s	narrower	question	of	predicting	Chinese	strategic	action,	but	it	can	speak	to	the	political	motivation	of	the	paper	in	that	it	helps	us	understand	China’s	rise.		
Strategic	Culture	&	China			 Strategic	culture	emerged	out	of	the	post-War	literature	on	cognitive	psychology	and	operational	 codes	pioneered	by	 the	 likes	of	Nathan	Leites	 (1951).	With	 its	 roots	planted	firmly	in	the	apprehension	surrounding	the	Cold	War	nuclear	standoff,	the	strategic	culture	literature	was	focused	on	the	realm	of	political	possibility	from	the	outset.	Its	development	was	less	concerned	with	what	states	like	the	USSR	would	do	than	with	what	they	could	do.	Ideas	of	rationality	got	theorists	and	policymakers	part	of	the	way,	but	there	was	a	persistent	concern	that	some	modes	of	behavior	lay	outside	the	boundaries	of	rational	choice	theories.	Strategic	culture	aimed	to	patch	up	the	gaps	where	rationality	failed.	
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	 Since	 its	 initial	 formulation,	 the	 concept	 of	 strategic	 culture	 has	 developed	 into	 a	robust	and	variegated	sector	of	scholarship.	John	Glenn	presents	a	helpful	categorization	of	the	literature	(2009),	which	he	groups	into	four	main	schools	of	thought:	epiphenomenal,	constructivist,	 poststructuralist,	 and	 interpretivist.	 Each	 of	 these	 approaches	 draws	 on	 a	different	constellation	of	literatures,	defining	strategic	culture	differently	and	applying	it	to	a	variety	of	empirical	cases.	The	full	range	of	the	literature	extends	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	so	here	I	will	focus	on	the	two	major	works	that	apply	strategic	culture	to	the	case	of	China,	both	of	which	operate	within	the	conventional	constructivist	vein1.		 Alastair	Iain	Johnston’s	work	from	the	mid-1990s	is	the	most	famous	examination	of	Chinese	 strategic	 culture.	 In	 his	 1995	book,	 Johnston	 starts	with	 a	 definition	 of	 strategic	culture	inspired	by	Clifford	Geertz’s	work	on	religious	culture:		“Strategic	culture	is	an	integrated	system	of	symbols	(i.e.,	argumentation	structures,	languages,	analogies,	metaphors,	etc.)	that	acts	to	establish	pervasive	and	long-lasting	grand	 strategic	 preferences	 by	 formulating	 concepts	 of	 the	 role	 and	 efficacy	 of	military	 force	 in	 interstate	political	affairs,	and	by	clothing	 these	conceptions	with	such	an	aura	of	factuality	that	the	strategic	preferences	seem	uniquely	realistic	and	efficacious.”	(36)				 Although	this	definition	is	helpful	conceptually,	it	is	not	immediately	obvious	how	to	implement	it	analytically.	Johnston	goes	on	to	specify	that	strategic	culture	operates	as	“a	consistent	set	of	ranked	preferences	that	persist	across	time	and	across	strategic	contexts.”	(1995,	52-54).	So	while	Johnston’s	ontology	of	strategic	culture	includes	symbolic	content,	his	 implementation	of	 it	 is	not	unlike	the	preference	rankings	of	game	theory	and	formal	modelling.																																																										1	For	other	examples	of	constructivist	approaches	to	strategic	culture	see	Barnett	(1996),	Berger	(1996),	and	Katzenstein	(1996a).	
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	 Johnston’s	understanding	of	strategic	culture	as	enduring	preference	rankings	makes	it	reasonable	to	dig	back	into	history	to	find	the	roots	these	preferences.	So	for	his	empirical	analysis,	Johnston	turns	to	China’s	Ming	Dynasty	(ca.	1368-1644	CE).	He	uses	the	texts	of	the	Seven	Military	Classics,	written	over	a	span	of	fourteen	centuries	(from	the	Sun	Zi	Bing	Fa,	ca.	500	BCE,	to	the	Tang	Tai	Zong	Li	Wei	Gong	Wen	Dui,	ca.	900	CE),	as	his	objects	of	analysis.	These	texts	constituted	the	canon	of	military	thought	that	government	officials	would	have	been	expected	to	familiarize	themselves	with	as	a	prerequisite	of	high	office.	To	analyze	the	texts,	Johnston	uses	a	method	called	cognitive	mapping,	which	draws	a	diagram	of	all	causal	statements	 in	 the	 text	 (explicit	 and	 implied).	 These	 statements	 link	 policy	 actions	 to	outcomes,	displaying	what	 the	author	viewed	as	 the	most	desired	outcomes	and	the	best	ways	of	attaining	those	outcomes.	That	is,	a	preference	ranking.		 The	core	insight	of	Johnston’s	multifaceted	study	is	that	China	displayed	a	dual-track	strategic	culture	under	the	Ming	Dynasty.	The	core	of	this	strategic	culture	is	what	Johnston	dubs	 the	 parabellum	 paradigm.	 This	 mode	 of	 strategic	 thought	 is	 characterized	 by	 an	inherently	 oppositional	 and	 zero-sum	 view	 of	 interstate	 security	 and	 a	 preference	 for	offensive	 tactics.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 parabellum	 paradigm,	 Johnston	 identifies	 a	 mode	 of	thought	inspired	by	Confucian	ideologies	that	overlays	the	cultural	realist	logic.	This	track	is	characterized	 by	 restraint	 and	 a	 preference	 for	 defensive	 tactics.	 Although	 Johnston	acknowledges	that	both	patterns	of	thought	are	present	in	the	discursive	milieu	of	the	Ming	Dynasty,	he	dismisses	the	Confucian	paradigm	as	symbolic	and	thus	irrelevant	for	explaining	strategic	behavior—a	puzzling	move,	given	his	initial,	Geertz-inspired	definition	of	strategic	culture.		
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	 In	 his	 1996	 article,	 Johnston	 extends	 his	 approach	 to	 examine	 Chinese	 strategic	culture	 under	 Mao.	 Applying	 his	 cognitive	 mapping	 methodology	 to	 Mao’s	 writings	 on	military	strategy,	he	identifies	similar	oppositional,	zero-sum	logic	in	Mao’s	thinking.	Since	he	is	primarily	concerned	with	verifying	the	parabellum	paradigm’s	persistence,	he	does	not	devote	much	time	to	the	other	track	but	does	note	that	the	Confucian	paradigm	does	not	seem	to	be	represented	in	Mao’s	thought.	Johnston	takes	this	as	confirmation	both	that	the	parabellum	paradigm	represents	the	core	of	Chinese	strategic	culture	and	that	that	core	is	durable	across	even	the	most	dramatic	of	regime	shifts.		 Much	more	 recently,	 Liu	 Tiewa	 has	 again	 taken	 up	 the	 study	 of	 Chinese	 strategic	culture.	 In	 her	 2014	 article,	 she	 critiques	 Johnston’s	 separation	 of	 the	 symbolic	 from	his	conception	of	operational	strategic	culture.	She	argues	that	this	is	an	artificial	decomposition	and	 unfounded	 based	 on	 Johnston’s	 own	 definition	 of	 strategic	 culture	 that	 rides	 on	 the	symbolic.	Instead	she	argues	for	what	she	calls	an	integrated	conception	of	strategic	culture	that	fuses	the	symbolic	with	the	operational.	She	argues	that	taking	an	integrated	approach	will	reveal	significant	complexities	that	are	lost	otherwise.		 Turning	to	the	case	of	China,	Liu	moves	through	the	developments	of	the	twentieth	century	 and	 the	 accompanying	 changes	 in	 Chinese	 strategic	 culture,	 emphasizing	 the	composite	nature	of	Chinese	strategic	thought.	She	identifies	the	initial	influences	from	both	Confucian	and	Daoist	political	philosophy	and	 then	goes	on	 to	 show	the	 incorporation	of	perspectives	 from	 Marxist	 thought	 under	 Mao.	 Moving	 beyond	 the	 ground	 covered	 by	Johnston,	Liu	 identifies	elements	under	Deng	and	Hu	 that	were	drawn	 from	 the	Western	Liberal	 tradition.	Using	select	 case	studies	 from	the	Korean,	Vietnam,	and	 Iraq	Wars,	 she	
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shows	these	various	conceptual	elements	in	play	as	Chinese	officials	formulate	their	foreign	policies.			 Liu	makes	a	compelling	critique	that	Johnston’s	work	on	strategic	culture	does	not	implement	an	integrated	definition,	and	she	shows	the	more	variegated	reality	of	Chinese	strategic	thought	that	comes	to	light	with	the	adoption	of	an	integrated	view	very	effectively.	This	nuance	allows	her	to	reconcile	seemingly	contradictory	instances	of	Chinese	strategic	behavior	that	Johnston	glosses	over.	However,	strategic	culture	in	her	usage	is	very	vaguely	defined.	 In	 fact,	 nowhere	 does	 she	 define	 the	 concept	 explicitly,	 and	 the	 theoretical	grounding	of	her	analysis	suffers	from	this	omission.	In	reintroducing	the	symbolic	to	the	study	of	strategic	culture,	she	treats	it	as	practically	synonymous	with	political	philosophy.	But	she	fails	to	provide	a	mechanism	by	which	the	philosophy	and	beliefs	interface	with	the	policymaking	process.	This	 leaves	us	with	the	message	that	the	symbolic	content	matters	and	an	understanding	of	the	complexity	we	lose	by	ignoring	it	but	little	to	no	comprehension	of	why	this	is	so	or	how	to	proceed	with	our	study	of	it	in	the	future.		
Integrated	Strategic	Culture			 Taking	 up	 Liu	 Tiewa’s	 call	 for	 an	 integrated	 approach	 to	 strategic	 culture,	 in	 this	section	I	outline	a	theoretically	grounded	conception	of	strategic	culture	that	integrates	the	symbolic	with	the	operational.	Symbols	are	important	factors	in	imbuing	the	political	with	meaning	 and	 significance,	 and	 excluding	 symbolic	 discourses	unnecessarily	 hamstrings	 a	theory’s	ability	to	explain	the	constitution	and	significance	of	strategic	action.	In	the	interest	of	anchoring	the	symbolic	in	the	concrete,	this	theory	also	provides	a	model	of	how	strategic	
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cultural	 symbols	delineate	 the	boundaries	of	 the	politically	possible,	 as	well	 as	a	process	allowing	that	constitutive	relationship	to	change	over	time.			Strategic	Culture	as	Meaning-Making			 Developing	such	an	inclusive	ontology	of	strategic	culture	requires	an	examination	of	symbols	 and	 their	 place	 in	 cultural	 processes.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 culture,	 a	 symbol	 can	be	defined	as	an	object	(whether	physical	or	ideational)	which	does	not	bear	meaning	in	and	of	itself	but	which	is	tied	to	an	abstract	meaning	by	intersubjective	understanding.	The	symbol	presents	and	embodies	what	it	signifies	such	that	invoking	the	signifier	calls	up	that	which	it	signifies.	Human	life	is	saturated	with	symbols.	They	can	be	physical	objects	or	images	(e.g.	flags,	religious	icons,	wedding	bands),	events	(e.g.	9/11	in	the	American	consciousness	or	the	1948	Nakba	in	the	Palestinian	consciousness),	or	even	linguistic	signs	(e.g.	letters,	words,	and	even	metaphors).			 In	thinking	about	symbols’	role	in	culture	then,	it	is	helpful	to	conceive	of	culture	as	meaning-making,	or	as	Lisa	Wedeen	(2002)	puts	it,	“semiotic	practices.”	If	symbols	are	the	vehicles	of	social	meaning,	then	culture	is	the	means	by	which	that	social	meaning	is	enacted	or	deployed.	A	society’s	culture	consists	of	the	shared	practices	by	which	members	of	the	society	make	sense	of	the	the	world	around	them	and	their	actions	in	it.	Wedeen	uses	the	example	of	an	individual	sowing	seeds.	Even	without	symbols,	the	observer	can	assess	the	causes	and	effects	at	play.	But	surface-level	observation	cannot	determine	the	meaning	the	act	has	for	the	participant	or	their	audience.	Is	it	a	game?	Is	it	a	solemn	religious	ceremony?	Is	it	an	act	of	military	or	supernatural	defense?	
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	 This	indeterminacy	of	significance	despite	clear	material	conditions	points	to	the	two	components	 of	 cultural	 systems.	 First	 is	 the	 causal	 content.	 This	 is	 the	 information	 the	outsider	can	glean	from	merely	observing	the	act.	In	the	seed	example,	the	observer	can	say	the	participant	is	planting	crops.	The	action	of	throwing	seeds	into	freshly	tilled	earth	has	material	consequences.	In	a	linguistic	example	such	as	the	utterance,	“Where	there’s	smoke,	there’s	fire,”	this	causal	content	would	be	the	if-then	statement	connecting	smoke	and	fire	in	an	 implied	 causal	 relationship.	 These	 relationships,	 if	 they	 are	 not	 objective,	 are	 at	 least	within	the	grasp	of	the	observer’s	subjectivity.			 But	 the	 cultural	 system	 also	 contains	 a	 set	 of	 constitutive	 content	 which	 is	 not	immediately	apprehensible	through	outsider	observation.	This	is	the	significance(s)	that	the	act	has	for	the	participants	and	their	audience.	In	Wedeen’s	seed	example	this	would	be	the	web	of	 association	 connected	 to	planting	 crops:	 collective	memories	 of	 planting	 seasons,	religious	and	intellectual	discussion	of	agriculture,	etc.	In	the	linguistic	example	this	would	be	 the	 pragmatic	 connotation	 of	 commenting	 on	 someone’s	 assumed	 culpability.	 This	information	is	context	contingent	and	often	communicated	verbally.		 If	both	these	forms	of	social	information	are	integral	to	an	understanding	of	culture,	then	we	can	define	strategic	culture	as	the	vocabulary	of	symbols,	the	meanings	they	carry,	and	the	semiotic	practices	that	deploy	them	in	the	context	of	national	security.	In	this	view,	strategic	culture	includes	not	only	the	relationships	between	policy	actions	and	objects,	but	also	 the	 significance	 of	 those	 actions	 and	 objects	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 the	 participants	 and	audience.	The	participants	here	are	all	parties	who	participate	in	a	society’s	foreign	policy	discourse.	 This	 includes	 the	 policymakers	 typically	 focused	 on	 in	 the	 strategic	 culture	literature	but	also	non-governmental	actors	 like	 journalists	and	policy	analysis.	Provided	
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there	is	some	form	of	discursive	communication	between	these	parties	and	those	enacting	policy	choices,	their	actions	contribute	to	the	performance	of	national	security	and	thus	fall	within	the	purview	of	strategic	culture.	This	 definition	 of	 strategic	 culture	 allows	 the	 observer	 to	 reincorporate	 symbolic	discourses	into	their	analysis.	Although	not	observable	from	a	surface-level	observation	of	security	practices,	they	are	still	indispensable	parts	of	those	practices	because	they	convey	the	intersubjective	significance	of	the	actions.	Without	understanding	the	significance	of	an	action,	 the	observer	cannot	 fully	understand	the	 intentionality	backing	up	that	action.	An	agent’s	 goal	 is	 implicated	 in	her	actions	because	 they	are	embedded	 in	a	 cultural	web	of	semiotic	associations.	More	than	just	material	cause	and	effect,	semiotic	content	shows	the	meanings	the	cause	and	effect	bear.	Significance	shows	not	only	what	the	actor	did,	but	what	she	 was	 trying	 to	 do.	 So	 without	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 symbolic,	 the	 entire	 enterprise	 of	strategic	cultural	studies,	which	aims	to	illuminate	states’	intentions,	is	futile.		Symbols	&	the	Boundaries	of	Possibility			 The	 importance	of	 signification	 for	 intentionality	 applies	not	only	 for	 the	external	observer	of	 security	processes	but	 also	 for	 the	 individuals	participating	 in	 them.	Foreign	policy	and	the	performance	of	national	security	is	an	inherently	communicative	process.	In	order	to	take	any	action,	policymakers	are	forced	to	communicate	with	each	other	and	with	their	audiences.	The	policymakers	need	to	justify	their	actions	to	those	they	are	accountable	to:	the	general	populace,	the	military	leaders,	and/or	the	wealthy	stakeholders,	depending	on	the	national	context.	
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	 This	 justification	uses	 the	 symbolic	 vocabulary	 of	 strategic	 culture	 as	 its	medium.	Making	foreign	policy	actions	intelligible	requires	referencing	meanings	that	the	audience	understands	and	relates	to.	Although	the	justification	can	be	a	separate	action	or	event,	it	is	often	rolled	 into	 the	same	discursive	act	 that	enacts	 the	decision.	George	W.	Bush’s	2001	speech	declaring	military	action	in	Afghanistan	can	act	as	an	example.	The	language	of	the	speech—the	very	language	that	performs	the	action	of	declaring	war—also	gives	that	action	meaning.	 Bush	 connects	 concepts	 of	 ‘freedom’	 and	 ‘American	 prosperity’	 to	 the	 newly	coalescing	object	of	‘September	11th,’	assembling	their	significances	to	render	his	declaration	of	war	meaningful.		 Relying	on	symbolic	vocabulary	to	communicate	policy	actions	places	an	important	constraint	on	foreign	policy.	To	be	sensible,	a	symbol	must	exist	in	both	the	speaker	and	the	listener’s	consciousness.	At	example	at	the	linguistic	level	would	be	a	sequence	of	sounds,	say	dim.	This	sequence	of	sounds	carries	the	meaning	of	a	lack	of	luminescence	to	the	speaker	of	English,	but	the	same	sequence	means	a	point	or	spot	to	the	Cantonese	speaker.	For	the	invocation	 of	 the	 sign	 dim	 to	 be	 effective,	 there	 must	 be	 a	 shared	 understanding	 of	 its	meaning.	At	the	political	level,	we	can	look	at	the	instance	of	events	like	9/11.	Such	a	date	only	has	significance	salient	to	justifying	invasion	if	there	is	a	shared	understanding	of	the	terrorist	 attacks	 that	 occurred	 and	 their	 psychological	 impact.	 Although	 this	 particular	meaning	is	widely	shared,	a	hypothetical	audience	unfamiliar	with	the	attacks	would	not	find	that	symbol	compelling.		 This	requirement	of	salience	places	an	important	constraint	on	political	actors.	Their	actions	must	be	 justified	using	a	 flexible	but	defined	 set	of	 symbols.	Following	 this	 logic,	policymakers	cannot	under	normal	circumstances	take	an	action	that	cannot	be	linked	to	a	
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shared	unit	of	meaning.	If	there	is	no	cultural	touchstone	for	an	action,	it	is	off	the	table	of	normal	 politics,	 even	 if	 the	 policymakers	 can	 conceive	 of	 it	 as	 viable	 strategy	 amongst	themselves.	This	means	that	the	contours	of	strategic	culture	define	the	set	of	socially	viable	foreign	policy	strategies	that	officials	have	to	choose	from.		 Moving	beyond	the	communication	between	elites	and	their	audiences,	there	is	still	another,	deeper	constraint	that	strategic	culture	places	on	the	policy	process.	Policymakers	consider	all	the	options	on	the	table,	but	what	they	even	see	as	options	are	culturally	and	linguistically	contingent	at	a	very	fundamental	 level.	This	draws	from	a	theory	associated	with	20th	century	linguist	Benjamin	Lee	Whorf,	aptly	named	the	Whorfian	hypothesis2:	that	language	itself	structures	our	cognition.	This	hypothesis,	which	challenged	the	conventional	understanding	 that	 cognition	 exists	 prior	 to	 and	 independent	 from	 the	 language	 used	 to	communicate	 it,	 has	 since	 been	 born	 out	 in	 numerous	 experimental	 and	 observational	studies	 (see	 for	 example	Boroditsky	2001).	The	 reasoning	 is	 that	 language	 allows	use	 to	parse	and	 categorize	 the	world	and	by	 its	 labels	 and	 symbols	we	are	able	 to	 construct	 a	mental	map	of	ourselves	and	our	environment.		If	this	cognitive	structuring	holds	true	down	to	phenomena	as	fundamental	as	color	perception	(see	Kay	&	Regier	2006),	then	it	stands	to	reason	that	it	should	hold	for	higher	order	 symbolic	 systems	 like	 strategic	 culture.	 Imagine	 a	 hypothetical	 society	 that	 has	no	shared	symbolic	representation	of	the	act	of	compromise.	There	are	no	stories	recounting	past	compromises	and	no	visual	representation	of	it.	There	may	not	even	be	a	lexical	item	that	carries	the	meaning.	In	such	a	society,	policy	leaders	would	be	hard-pressed	to	consider																																																									2	The	Whorfian	hypothesis	has	attracted	some	criticism	on	the	grounds	that	many	of	its	applications	tend	towards	treating	language	as	the	sole	determinant	of	behavior.	However,	the	original	hypothesis,	which	I	have	used	here,	does	not	make	these	deterministic	claims.		
	 15	
it	as	an	option.	It	does	not	exist	as	a	separate	category	of	action	in	their	mind.	It	is	not	a	case	of	 considering	 and	 rejecting	 the	 option.	 The	 option	 does	 not	 even	 enter	 their	 field	 of	cognition.	The	symbol	is	not	only	necessary	for	communicating	action	but	also	for	conceiving	of	it	as	possible.		These	 insights	 from	 linguistic	 scholarship	 on	 symbolic	 systems	 of	 communication	show	that	adopting	an	integrated	view	of	strategic	culture	that	reincorporates	the	symbolic	need	not	divorce	the	concept	from	the	realities	of	making	policy.	Indeed,	if	anything,	viewing	strategic	culture	as	a	semiotic	system	places	it	at	the	core	of	strategic	practices.	This	system	defines	the	boundaries	of	the	communicable	and	even	the	conceivable.	By	understanding	the	contours	of	a	society’s	strategic	culture,	the	outside	observer	can	understand	the	realm	of	political	 possibility	 within	 which	 they	 operate.	 Contrary	 to	 Johnston’s	 assumption,	 the	symbolic	discourses	are	not	irrelevant	to	the	formulation	and	implementation	of	policy.	They	make	it	possible	and	as	such	constitute	the	preconditions	of	the	causal	beliefs	that	Johnston	bases	his	work	on.			Integration	and	Diachrony			 Although	 this	 integrated	view	brings	 the	 symbolic	back	 into	 the	 study	of	 strategic	culture,	it	does	not	self-evidently	allow	for	changes	like	the	ones	that	Liu	observes	in	Chinese	strategic	culture	over	the	course	of	the	20th	century.	Someone	could	still	conceivably	make	a	primordialist	argument	using	an	integrated	view	by	assuming	a	constancy	of	the	symbolic	relationships.	After	all,	the	reasoning	might	go,	symbols	must	have	shared	meanings	to	be	
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intelligible,	and	using	a	symbol	outside	of	its	agreed-upon	meaning	renders	it	nonsensical.	How	then	could	the	system	of	symbols	ever	change?		 The	key	for	addressing	this	argument	comes	from	a	closer	examination	of	the	nature	of	these	signs	that	make	up	strategic	culture.	Drawing	again	from	linguistic	conceptions	of	semiotics,	 a	 sign	 consists	 of	 two	 parts:	 the	 signifier	 and	 the	 signified.	 The	 relationship	between	the	signifier	and	the	signified	is	fundamentally	arbitrary.	The	signifier	does	not	bear	any	inherent	connection	to	the	signified.	Nothing	about	the	word	‘red’	must	necessarily	refer	to	the	color	of	light	with	a	wavelength	between	620	and	750	nanometers.	The	signifier	and	signified	are	connected	by	common	consensus.	Put	succinctly,	the	sign	does	not	have	to	be	so;	it	is	so	because	we	make	it	so.		 Because	significance	is	contingent	on	common	usage,	it	can	and	does	change	as	the	patterns	of	 its	usage	change.	To	be	clear,	 this	does	not	negate	my	previous	assertion	that	intelligibility	depends	on	conforming	to	norm	of	usage.	Blatant	re-appropriation	of	a	sign’s	meaning	 is	still	nonsensical	 from	a	communicative	perspective.	 Invoking	the	sign	 ‘fish’	 to	references	a	rabbit	will	a	few	eyebrows	and	evoke	a	few	laughs.	Unless,	context	makes	the	speaker’s	meaning	clear	(for	example,	by	point	to	the	rabbit	in	question),	the	communication	will	not	be	effective.	But	 incremental	shifts	 that	accumulate	 into	 large	shifts	are	possible.	Take	the	semantic	development	of	the	English	word	‘silly.’	In	its	Anglo-Saxon	incarnation	as	
sellig	it	carried	the	meaning	of	today’s	word	‘blessed.’	Through	the	shift	to	Middle	English,	however,	 it’s	meaning	was	broadened	beyond	 religious	 contexts	 to	 include	 references	 to	children.	 Then	 as	 Middle	 English	 morphed	 into	 Modern	 English,	 the	 original	 religious	contexts	were	excluded	from	the	word’s	meaning.	Each	of	these	moves	was	within	the	range	
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of	 intelligibility	 for	 the	 speakers	 at	 the	 time,	 but	 in	 sum	 they	 shifted	 the	 role	 of	 the	 sign	substantially.			 Both	types	of	incremental	shifts	can	happen	in	higher-order	symbolic	systems	as	well.	For	an	example	of	a	broadening	move,	take	the	shifting	meaning	of	‘security.’	Historically,	the	 invocation	 of	 the	 signifier	 ‘security’	 has	 been	 connected	 to	 safety	 from	 material,	specifically	 military	 threats.	 However,	 as	 the	 modern	 nation-state	 has	 developed,	 and	especially	 in	 the	 last	 century,	 numerous	 other	 concerns	 have	 been	 brought	 under	 the	umbrella	of	 ‘security.’	Ole	Wæver	calls	this	 ‘securitization,’	 the	process	of	grouping	issues	into	the	semantic	field	of	security	(Wæver	1993)3.		 There	are	other,	less	well-studied	processes	of	excluding	concepts	from	a	given	sign’s	semantic	field.	An	ongoing	example	in	North	American	security	discourse	is	the	the	signifier	‘terrorism.’	 In	 the	 21st	 century	American	 (especially	White	American)	 consciousness,	 the	concept	of	 terrorism	has	become	deeply	entangled	with	 the	 idea	of	 Islam.	This	has	come	about	through	an	accumulation	of	speech	acts,	and	while	it	is	not	a	universal	association,	it	is	 common	 enough	 to	 be	widely	 understood.	However,	 in	 recent	 years,	 there	 has	 been	 a	conscious	move	on	the	part	of	American	Muslims	and	their	allies	to	move	mainstream	Islam	out	from	under	terrorism’s	umbrella.	Motivated	by	a	desire	to	counteract	Islamophobia,	this	discursive	move	redraws	the	boundaries	of	the	sign	‘terrorism.’			 A	deepened	understanding	of	signs’	mutability	adds	a	new	dimension	to	the	study	of	semiotic	 systems.	 In	 his	 seminal	 Course	 in	 General	 Linguistics,	 Ferdinand	 de	 Saussure	
																																																								3	Scholars	have	examined	the	rhetorical	securitization	of	various	sectors	of	politics	and	the	concrete	implications	that	that	discursive	move	has	on	security	practices.	See	for	example	Elbe	(2006)	on	HIV/AIDS,	Trombetta	(2008)	on	environmental	security,	and	Léonard	(2010)	on	the	securitization	of	migration.	
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describes	what	he	calls	a	“radical	duality”	between	an	“axis	of	simultaneities”	and	an	“axis	of	successions”	(de	Saussure	1916;	p.	79).	Endemic	to	all	systems	of	values—systems	which	equate	 things	 of	 different	 orders—in	 the	 context	 of	 semiotic	 systems,	 this	 divergence	describes	 the	differences	between	how	symbols	operate	at	a	given	 time	 (the	synchronic)	from	 how	 their	 operation	 operates	 through	 time	 (diachronic).	 Although	 synchrony	 and	diachrony	 call	 for	 different	modes	 of	 analysis,	 because	 they	 are	 dimensions	 of	 the	 same	phenomenon,	they	are	intertwined	with	one	another.	Strategic	culture	cannot	be	studied	as	a	system	of	meaning-making	without	acknowledging	both.		 By	 combining	 synchronic	 and	 diachronic	 perspectives,	 the	 question	 of	 strategic	culture’s	durability,	which	Johnston	assumes	and	Liu	refutes,	begins	to	resolve	itself.	Along	the	synchronic	dimension	is	the	contingent	but	intersubjectively	held	relationship	between	strategic	symbols	and	what	they	signify.	Along	the	diachronic	dimension	are	the	processes	by	which	that	relationship	is	reshaped.	Fusing	them	gives	us	a	picture	of	strategic	culture	as	what	 I	would	 term	 ‘plastically	durable.’	These	 systems	of	 significance	 can	and	do	change	substantially,	but	that	change	is	beyond	the	power	of	a	single	actor	to	effect.	It	requires	a	shift	 in	 the	 whole	 collective’s	 understanding.	 So	 we	 begin	 to	 see	 strategic	 culture	 as	something	which,	while	it	does	not	stretch	back	unchanged	into	pre-modern	times,	does	not	change	with	every	turn	of	the	social	currents	either.		 Taking	a	view	of	strategic	culture	as	a	semiotic	system	and	its	accompanying	practices	of	meaning-making	allows	us	to	answer	Liu’s	call	to	reincorporate	symbolic	discourses	as	a	central	 part	 of	 strategic	 culture.	 This	 revitalized	 symbolic	 phenomenon	 is	 not	 politically	toothless	 as	 Johnston	 treats	 it.	 It	mediates	what	policymakers	 can	 realistically	 enact	 and	communicate	and	even	delineates	what	they	can	imagine	politically.	Critically,	this	system	of	
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signification	can	shift	over	time—not	capriciously,	but	gradually	and	enough	that	over	time	there	 emerge	 substantial	 differences.	 These	 synchronic	 and	 diachronic	 insights	 make	untenable	the	view	that	strategic	culture	endures	immutably	as	a	set	of	preference	rankings.	This	opens	the	door	theoretically	to	Liu’s	argument	that	China’s	strategic	culture	draws	on	many	different	 sources,	morphing	 significantly	 over	 the	20th	 century	 and	 thus	 cannot	 be	understood	in	simplistic	terms	of	stable	monolithic	paradigms	of	Confucianism	or	realpolitik	as	Johnston	and	other	approach	it.			
Studying	Integrated	Strategic	Culture			 Deploying	an	 integrated	conception	of	strategic	culture	and	using	 it	 to	understand	specific	cases	like	China	requires	the	development	of	a	new	methodology.	The	empirics	of	Liu	Tiewa’s	study	are	convincing	but	unsystematic.	There	is	no	consistent	object	of	analysis	or	methodology	for	dissecting	the	selected	objects.	Her	work	is	helpful	for	critiquing	existing	assumptions	about	strategic	culture,	but	its	usefulness	for	application	beyond	Liu’s	empirical	scope	 is	 limited.	 On	 the	 other	 side,	 Johnston’s	method	 is	 systematic	 but	 insufficient.	 His	technique	 of	 cognitive	 mapping	 only	 shows	 how	 concepts	 in	 a	 text	 are	 related	 to	 each	causally.	It	does	not	give	any	insight	into	what	those	concept	means.	The	study	of	strategic	culture	as	a	system	of	meaning-making	calls	for	a	methodology	that	is	both	systematic	and	able	to	capture	the	semantic	fields	of	objects,	not	just	their	effects	on	one	another.		 For	my	work	here,	I	utilize	a	discursive	approach	called	predicate	analysis	as	outlined	by	 Jennifer	Milliken	 (1999).	 Predicate	 analysis	 takes	 advantage	 of	 a	 grammatical	 feature	shared	 across	 languages:	 the	 subject-predicate	 statement	 structure.	 The	 template	 of	 a	
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linguistic	proposition	consists	of	a	subject—an	entity	that	the	proposition	concerns—and	a	predicate—a	property	ascribed	to	the	subject.	 In	a	simple	proposition	such	as	“China	is	a	large	 country,”	 the	 property	 of	 ‘being	 a	 large	 country’	 is	 assigned	 to	 the	 subject	 ‘China,’	constituting	the	set	of	meanings	attached	to	the	word	‘China’	as	it	is	used	in	that	particular	context.	 Understanding	 this	 semantic	 relationship	 allows	 the	 analyst	 to	 mine	 a	 text	 for	insight	 into	 the	 full	 range	 of	 notions	 involved	 in	 a	 given	 strategic	 symbol,	 showing	what	meanings	are	implicated	when	the	symbol	is	invoked.	Predicates	attached	to	one	subject	can	also	make	reference	to	another.	For	example,	in	 the	 proposition	 “Japan	 is	 occupying	 China,”	 the	 primary	 subject	 is	 ‘Japan,’	 which	 is	described	 as	 occupying	 China.	 But	 this	 statement	 also	 provides	 information	 about	 the	semantic	 field	of	 ‘China’	because	 it	 frames	China	as	being	occupied	by	 Japan.	 In	this	case,	although	‘China’	occupies	a	position	as	a	grammatical	object,	in	a	discursive	sense	it	is	still	a	subject,	 because	 the	 proposition	 conveys	 information	 to	 define	 its	 semantic	 field.	 This	feature	of	juxtaposing	multiple	subjects	in	a	single	proposition	allows	the	analyst	to	draw	connections	between	the	various	subjects	described	in	a	text.	‘Japan’	and	‘China’	are	defined	in	relation	to	each	other.		A	 complete	 predicate	 analysis	 of	 a	 text	 yields	 a	 concept	 map	 that	 describes	 the	contours	of	 the	 subjects	 and	 their	 relationships	with	 each	other.	Each	node	 represents	 a	different	subject,	whose	significance	is	described	in	terms	of	the	predicates	attached	to	it.	Lines	connect	these	nodes	describing	the	relationships	between	them.	This	improves	on	the	cognitive	mapping	methodology	that	Johnston	uses	because	it	captures	both	causality	and	constitution.	In	fact,	it	hints	that	the	distinction	between	the	two	may	be	overstated,	since	
	 21	
the	causal	relationships	between	subjects	are	part	of	the	same	predicates	that	constitute	the	individual	subjects.	If	these	concept	maps	derived	from	predicate	analysis	give	us	a	synchronic	picture	of	a	state’s	strategic	cultural	discourse,	then	we	can	use	maps	from	different	points	in	time	to	assess	diachronic	 changes	 in	 strategic	 culture.	These	 changes	 can	be	 grouped	under	 two	aspects.	First,	a	given	symbol	may	become	associated	with	different	meanings	over	time	as	in	 the	 case	of	 securitization	discussed	 above.	 Second,	 a	 given	 concept	may	be	 associated	different	signifiers	over	time.	An	example	of	this,	which	will	be	discussed	in	detail	in	the	next	section,	is	the	concept	of	socialization	into	an	ethical/moral	system,	which	is	referred	to	by	different	terms	throughout	Chinese	history.	Because	this	approach	to	strategic	culture	conceives	of	language	and	its	usage	as	the	factors	constraining	policy,	it	can	be	applied	to	analyze	any	piece	of	discourse	on	security	and	strategy.	Insider	records	of	the	policymaking	process	are	not	necessarily	privileged	over	public	statements	about	foreign	policy	as	they	are	when	using	cognitive	mapping,	because	both	 are	 part	 of	 the	 same	 ideational	 milieu.	 Neither	 should	 present	 a	 view	 of	 strategic	thought	that	is	contradictory	to	the	other’s	portrayal.	However,	because	different	sectors	of	the	strategic	discursive	environment	will	have	different	emphases,	for	diachronic	analyses	it	is	important	to	analyze	similar	cross	sections	for	each	time	period.			Application:	Deng	Xiaoping’s	Strategic	Culture			 By	way	of	illustration,	I	apply	this	predicate	analysis	technique	here	to	analyze	the	Chinese	 strategic	 culture	under	 the	 administration	of	Deng	Xiaoping	 from	1978	 to	1992.	
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Over	the	course	of	his	tenure,	Deng	gave	five	major	addresses	that	touched	on	matters	of	national	security	and	military	strategy.	 In	chronological	order,	 these	are:	(1)	“Speech	at	a	Plenary	Meeting	of	 the	Central	Military	Committee”	《在中央军委全体会议上的讲话》on	December	28,	1977;	(2)	“Realize	the	Four	Modernizations	and	Never	Seek	Hegemony”	《实
现四化，永不称霸》on	 May	 7,	 1978;	 (3)	 “Streamline	 the	 Army	 and	 Raise	 its	 Combat	Effectiveness”	《精简军队，提高战斗力》on	March	12,	1980;	(4)	“Build	Powerful,	Modern,	and	Regularized	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces”	《建设强大的现代化正规化的革命军队》on	September	19,	1981;	and	(5)	“Speech	at	a	Forum	of	the	Central	Military	Committee”	《在军
委座谈会上的讲话》on	 July	4,	1982.	The	combined	 full	 text	of	 the	 speeches	 totals	about	17,000	characters	in	length4.		 [Figure	1:	Schematic	Representation	of	Dengist	Strategic	Culture]			 A	full	dissection	of	the	symbols	and	semiotic	practices	displayed	in	these	texts	could	fill	an	entire	book,	but	I	would	like	to	touch	on	two	main	themes	visible	from	this	overview	of	 Deng’s	 strategic	 culture.	 First,	 in	 Deng’s	 conception	 of	 the	 fundamental	 nature	 of	international	politics,	we	see	an	interesting	mix	of	Johnston’s	and	Liu’s	arguments.	Deng	does	speak	of	cooperation	and	solidarity;	which	Liu	picks	up	on	in	her	argument	that	Deng	draws	from	Western	traditions	of	Liberalism.	However,	this	solidarity	is	only	presented	by	Deng	as	a	possibility	between	states	with	already	compatible	interests	(determined	by	their	position	
																																																								4	Many	thanks	to	the	staff	at	the	National	Library	of	China	in	Beijing	for	their	assistance	in	locating	and	digitizing	the	full	texts	of	these	speeches.	
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in	global	structures	of	exploitation).	In	this	we	see	a	reflection	of	Johnston’s	argument	that	a	view	of	politics	as	zero-sum	runs	throughout	Chinese	history.		 Second,	from	this	overview	we	can	gain	some	insight	into	the	Deng	administration’s	preferred	mode	 of	 operation	 in	 foreign	 policy	matters.	 Deng	 frames	 national	 security	 as	depending	on	three	pillars:	economic	development,	the	development	of	modernized	armed	forces,	and	the	rallying	of	public	support.	All	three	of	these	pillars	are	articulated	as	defensive	measures.	The	goal	in	modernizing	the	army	is	to	better	enable	it	to	anticipate	and	defend	against	 attacks	 from	 the	 main	 adversaries	 (the	 USA	 and	 USSR	 in	 Deng’s	 eyes).	 This	contributes	to	an	overall	defensive	orientation	that	permeates	Deng’s	strategic	culture.	Force	is	to	be	used	primarily	(perhaps	exclusively)	as	a	mode	of	defending	China	from	external	threats,	 not	 as	 a	 way	 of	 proactively	 furthering	 Chinese	 interests.	 This	 insight	 from	 a	constitutive	 examination	of	 Chinese	 strategic	 culture	 contrasts	with	 the	 image	of	 a	more	offensively	 oriented	 China	 suggested	 by	 Johnston	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 causal	 beliefs	 he	identifies.		
Cultivating	Talent	and	Benevolence				 Here	I	would	like	to	focus	on	the	anatomy	of	a	specific	symbol	that	appears	in	Chinese	strategic	culture	under	Deng:	rencai	(人才).	Typically	translated	into	English	as	‘talent,’	this	concept	does	not	at	first	appear	to	have	much	more	significance	than	technical	capability	and	political	knowledge.	According	to	this	reading	of	the	term,	Deng’s	concern	with	cultivating	talent	seems	to	be	primarily	one	of	human	resource	development.		
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	 However,	 if	we	 read	his	writings	with	 an	 eye	 towards	 sketching	out	 the	 semantic	boundaries	of	the	term,	we	see	it	has	more	depth	than	the	gloss	of	‘talent’	would	suggest.	For	example,	in	his	July	4,	1982	“Speech	at	a	Forum	of	the	Military	Commission	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC”	(Chinese:	《在军委座谈会上的讲话》),	Deng	Xiaoping	relates	a	brief	anecdote,	which	I	have	translated	below:		 “The	 year	 before	 last,	 I	 went	with	 Comrade	 Chen	 Pixian	 to	 the	 No.	 2	 Automobile	Factory.	There	was	an	assistant	director	there	who	accompanied	us	and	showed	us	around	the	factory.	He	made	a	great	impression	on	me.	What	do	I	mean	by	that?	In	such	a	large	automobile	factory,	he	was	the	technical	backbone	of	the	operation,	very	competent	in	his	work.	By	this	I	mean	to	describe	his	capability.	At	that	time,	he	was	38	years	old;	now	he	is	40.	More	importantly,	he	was	attacked	during	the	“Cultural	Revolution.”	He	was	one	who	opposed	the	beating,	the	smashing,	the	looting.	Since	then	 he	 has	 been	 a	 picture	 of	 good	 character,	 including	 his	 attitude	 towards	 the	problems	in	our	so-called	“Oppose	Rightist	Trends	of	Overturning	Correct	Verdicts”	campaign.	This	kind	of	rencai	is	particularly	heartening.	There	is	no	lack	of	this	sort	of	person,	and	 it	 is	easy	 to	distinguish	 them.	 In	making	promotions,	 these	sorts	of	political	qualifications	should	be	our	first	priority.”				 Deng	Xiaoping	uses	this	anecdote	as	an	illustration	of	what	he	means	when	he	calls	for	the	Chinese	armed	forces	to	focus	on	cultivating	and	identifying	rencai.	From	it	we	can	glean	that	rencai	encompasses	two	main	components.	One	is	the	technical	ability	that	the	gloss	‘talent’	refers	to	intuitively.	This	is	what	Deng	refers	to	as	‘capability’	or	nengli	(能力).	The	second	component,	which	Deng	ranks	as	more	important,	is	moral	uprightness	or	good	character.	Deng	refers	to	this	attribute	when	he	says	the	assistant	director	is	“a	picture	of	good	character”	or	biaoxian	haode	(表现好的).	Both	these	technical	and	moral	capabilities	are	subsumed	under	the	domain	of	the	word	rencai.		
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	 If	we	examine	this	deepened	understanding	of	rencai’s	conceptual	boundaries	in	light	of	Deng	Xiaoping’s	strategic	culture	in	general	(see	Fig.	1),	we	can	see	the	role	it	plays	in	his	conception	of	national	security.	Cultivating	rencai	is	one	of	the	four	immediately	actionable	policies	that	will	benefit	Chinese	national	security.	He	sees	it	as	directly	contributing	to	the	army’s	ability	to	mobilize	effectively	for	combat.	This	in	turn	is	an	important	factor	in	the	military	modernization	efforts	that	Deng	championed.	In	his	view,	China’s	national	security	depended	direction	 on	 having	 a	modernized	 army.	 So	 there	 is	 a	 causal	 chain	 linking	 the	cultivation	of	moral	talent	to	military	strength,	greater	security	from	international	threats,	and	ultimately	enhanced	national	prosperity.		 This	reading	of	rencai	 and	 its	context	bears	a	striking	resemblance	 to	 the	political	writings	of	Mencius.	Also	known	as	Mengzi,	Mencius	(ca.	372	–	289	BCE)	was	one	of	the	most	prominent	 Confucian	 thinkers	 of	 ancient	 China.	 His	 expositions	 on	 Confucius’	 teachings	formed	a	key	part	of	the	corpus	which	all	Imperial-era	officials	were	expected	to	memorize	in	order	 to	advance	 in	civil	service.	One	concept	 in	particular	stands	out	as	salient	 to	 the	discussion	of	the	moral	man	in	politics:	renzheng	(仁政).	Typically	translated	as	‘benevolent	governance,’	 this	 term	 refers	 to	 the	 political	 application	 of	 ren,	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	Confucian	moral	complex,	closely	connected	to	the	idea	of	righteousness	or	yi	(義).	It	too	can	be	illustrated	with	an	anecdote	from	Mencius’	writings.		 “King	Hui	of	Liang	said,	‘As	you,	Sir,	know,	among	the	states	under	heaven,	none	was	stronger	 than	my	own	 state	 of	 Jin.	But	 by	 the	 time	 it	 came	down	 to	me,	we	were	defeated	by	Qi	in	the	east,	and	my	eldest	sons	died	from	that	defeat.	We	lost	700	li	of	land	to	the	Qin	 in	the	west.	We	were	dishonored	by	Chu	 in	the	south.	 I	am	deeply	ashamed	of	these	things	and	I	wish	for	the	sake	of	the	dead	to	wash	away	this	shame	once	and	for	all.	What	should	I	do?’		
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Mencius	answered	him	saying,	‘One	can	have	a	territory	of	but	100	li	on	each	side	and	still	 rule	as	a	 true	king.	My	king,	 if	 you	put	 in	place	benevolent	governance	of	 the	people,	 use	 punishment	 sparingly,	 collect	 only	 light	 taxes,	 allowing	 the	 people	 to	plough	deeply	and	weed	without	difficulty,	 and	 if	 the	 strong	men	would	use	 their	spare	time	to	cultivate	filial	piety,	brotherly	love,	loyalty,	and	trustworthiness	such	that	 they	would	serve	their	 fathers	and	brothers	at	home	and	be	good	servants	 to	their	 elders	 and	 princes	 outside	 the	 home,	 then	 they	 can	 be	 called	 upon	 to	make	cudgels	and	clubs	which	 they	would	use	 to	overcome	 the	strong	armor	and	sharp	weapons	of	Qin	and	Chu.	Those	others	rulers	take	their	people	away	from	their	time	for	farming,	making	them	unable	to	cultivate	in	order	to	support	their	parents.	Their	parents	thus	freeze	and	starve;	their	brothers,	wives,	and	children	scatter.	Because	they	overwhelm	their	people,	if	you	the	king	were	to	go	and	attack	them,	who	would	be	a	match	for	you?	Therefore,	it	is	said	that	the	benevolent	man	has	no	match.	I	beg	of	you	not	to	have	any	doubts	of	it,	your	majesty.’”				 Here,	 as	 in	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 writings,	 we	 see	 a	 link	 drawn	 between	morality	 and	security.	Cultivation	of	ren	by	the	ruler	of	the	state	leads	to	a	“trickle-down	righteousness”	whereby	 the	 people	 come	 to	 embody	 the	 same	 righteousness	 as	 the	 ruler.	 This	 societal	righteousness	 produces	 a	 stable	 domestic	 order,	 which	 allows	 the	 ruler	 to	mobilize	 the	people	militarily	to	achieve	his	security	goals.	This	is	not	an	isolated	reference	in	Mencius.	The	concept	of	ren	 is	 repeatedly	 connected	 to	 security,	 even	being	 framed	as	a	 sufficient	condition	for	ruling	everything	under	heaven	(tianxia	天下).	Like	rencai	in	Deng’s	thinking,	
ren	can	be	found	in	most	people	but	must	be	actively	cultivated.		 It	seems	very	clear	from	this	juxtaposition	that	rencai	as	it	appears	in	Deng	Xiaoping’s	strategic	cultural	discourse	is	a	Confucian-inspired	concept.	Although	not	explicitly	inflected	in	Confucian	terms	(likely	because	of	the	volatile	political	climate	and	antagonism	towards	traditional	 culture	 during	Deng’s	 time),	 its	 general	 semantic	 contours	 are	 the	 same.	 The	moral	man	presented	as	the	lynchpin	of	state	security	in	both.		
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	 This	raises	the	question	of	whether	this	has	always	been	the	case.	If	Confucian	units	of	 meaning	 appear	 in	 Chinese	 strategic	 culture	 under	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	 even	 occupying	 a	similar	position	conceptually	as	 the	key	 to	effective	military	mobilization,	 then	one	could	argue	 that	Confucianism	has	held	 constant	 as	 an	 important	 influence	 in	Chinese	political	culture	from	the	Warring	States	period	through	the	Imperial	era	and	Communist	revolution	into	 the	present.	Although	this	argument	need	not	assert	 that	Confucianism	was	the	only	conceptual	framework	at	play,	just	demonstrating	that	it	never	disappeared	would	support	the	idea	that	Confucianism	is	essential	to	Chinese	culture,	consistent	with	a	monolithic,	static	view	of	Chinese	strategic	culture.			 However,	if	we	look	to	modern	China’s	other	great	military	and	political	leader	Mao	Zedong,	we	see	an	important	difference.	The	moral	man	is	conspicuously	absent	from	Mao’s	writings	on	military	strategy	and	 foreign	policy.	While	Mao	does	 talk	at	 length	about	 the	importance	 of	 training	 and	 the	 cultivation	 of	military	 skill,	 his	 focus	 is	 not	 on	 the	moral	dimension	of	training.	This	is	not	to	say	Mao’s	depiction	of	national	security	is	completely	amoral.	His	discussions	of	training	are	all	tinged	with	a	distinct	moral	flavor.	However,	unlike	the	morality	 of	Mencius	 and	Deng,	Mao’s	 sense	of	 right	 and	wrong	 is	 not	 situated	 in	 the	individual	but	in	the	political	movement	as	a	whole.	This	can	be	seen	in	his	discussions	of	political	training	of	cadres	in	Basic	Tactics	or《基本战略》:		 “In	 order	 to	 assure	 that	 all	 the	 independent	 actions	 of	 a	 guerrilla	 unit	 achieve	complete	victory,	aside	from	bolstering	military	training,	the	most	important	thing	is	that	we	must	make	certain	that	the	officers	and	soldiers	have	a	high	level	of	‘political	consciousness’	and	‘devotion’	to	their	cause.	Political	training	is	the	only	method	by	which	this	objective	can	be	achieved.”		
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And	again	later	on:		 “We	 must	 carry	 out	 political	 instruction	 directed	 toward	 the	 resurrection	 of	 our	people	(stimulate	the	soldiers'	national	consciousness,	their	patriotism,	and	their	love	for	 the	people	and	 the	masses)	and	ensure	 that	every	officer	and	soldier	 in	a	unit	understands	not	only	the	tasks	for	which	he	is	responsible	but	also	the	necessity	of	fighting	in	defense	of	our	state.	We	must	also	pay	attention	to	supporting	the	leaders,	to	 maintaining	 the	 unit’s	 solidarity	 with	 genuine	 sincerity,	 to	 carrying	 out	 and	completing	 the	 orders	 of	 one's	 superiors,	 and	 to	 maintaining	 an	 iron	 military	discipline.	 We	 must	 see	 that	 the	 multitude	 of	 the	 soldiers	 are	 of	 one	 mind	 and	equipped	with	both	the	resolve	and	the	will	to	save	our	country	together.	Apart	from	strengthening	its	own	fighting	capacity,	a	unit	must	also	carry	out	propaganda	among	the	masses	regarding	the	plots	of	the	invaders	and	of	the	enemy.”				 Although	there	is	a	sense	of	righteousness	that	Mao	thinks	should	be	instilled	in	the	troops,	its	focus	is	not	on	the	good	character	of	individuals.	Instead,	it	is	a	morality	derived	from	class	struggle.	Its	cultivation	is	framed	in	terms	of	national	consciousness,	patriotism	and	devotion	 to	 the	 cause.	Nowhere	 is	 there	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 primacy	 of	 individual’s	 good	character	 or	 the	 implication	 that	 the	 state’s	 security	will	 fall	 into	 place	 if	 that	 individual	morality	is	cultivated.			 The	history	of	this	symbol	of	the	moral	man	shows	a	specific	instance	of	diachronic	change	 in	Chinese	strategic	culture.	The	moral	man	was	an	element	central	 to	 traditional	Confucian	conceptions	of	security	and	interstate	relations	during	the	Imperial	era.	However,	this	element	disappears	during	Mao’s	 tenure,	replaced	by	a	class-based	sense	of	morality	drawn	from	Marxist-Leninist	thought	and	situated	in	the	collective	rather	than	the	individual.	This	 class-based	 conception	 of	 national	 security	 fades	 after	 Mao	 dies,	 and	 under	 Deng	Xiaoping	the	notion	of	the	moral	man	reemerges,	but	now	framed	using	different	vocabulary	that	disguises	its	Confucian	roots.	The	disappearance	and	subsequent	reappearance	of	the	
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moral	man	in	Chinese	security-related	semiotic	practices	illustrates	the	mutability	we	expect	if	we	 take	 an	 integrated	 view	 of	 strategic	 culture	 that	 includes	 symbolic	 discourses	 in	 a	system	of	meaning-making.		 Synchronically,	 this	 concept	of	 the	moral	man	as	 the	 lynchpin	of	national	 security	reorients	our	understanding	of	Chinese	foreign	policy	under	Deng	Xiaoping.	Johnston’s	claim	that	China	has	been	characterized	by	culturally	enabled	realpolitik	thinking	for	centuries	no	longer	seems	sensible.	 Instead,	we	see	a	picture	of	Deng’s	strategic	thought	and	policy	as	focused	 on	 defensive	 capabilities	 supported	 and	 guided	 by	 an	 innate	 moral	 compass	cultivated	at	every	level	of	the	political	process,	aspects	only	captured	by	an	approach	that	focuses	on	 culture’s	 constitutive	 content.	But	 instead	of	 encouraging	us	 to	 treat	China	as	defensively	oriented	in	its	essence,	arriving	at	this	understanding	through	a	dynamic	theory	of	 strategic	 culture	prompts	us	 to	 turn	our	 gaze	 forward	with	 a	 sensitivity	 to	how	 these	discourses	shift	and	change	the	realm	of	political	possibility.		
Conclusion			 In	 this	 paper	 I	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 Chinese	 strategic	 culture	 by	refuting	the	notion	that	Chinese	strategic	thought	must	either	be	essentially	Confucian	or	not	Confucian	at	all.	Specifically,	I	have	joined	Liu	Tiewa	in	responding	to	Alastair	Iain	Johnston’s	assertion	 that	 China	 has	 a	 realpolitik	 strategic	 culture	 that	 has	 endured	 for	 centuries.	Answering	Liu’s	call	for	an	integrated	view	of	strategic	culture		that	accommodates	changes	over	time,	I	have	drawn	from	linguistic	anthropology	to	understand	strategic	culture	as	a	system	of	meaning-making	practices.	This	system	mediates	policymakers’	formulation	and	
	 30	
articulation	of	policies	and	has	the	capacity	to	change	over	time.	This	provides	a	theoretical	grounding	 for	 the	 changes	 Liu	Tiewa	observed	 empirically	 but	 did	 not	 frame	within	 any	larger	theory.		 I	 developed	 predicate	 analysis	 as	 the	 ideal	 methodology	 for	 examining	 strategic	culture	 from	the	vantage	point	of	semiotic	practices.	By	 looking	at	 the	 the	characteristics	assigned	to	objects	in	the	text	rather	than	just	the	relationships	between	objects,	this	method	gives	us	greater	insight	into	the	constitutive	content	of	strategic	culture	without	sacrificing	our	understanding	of	the	causal	content.	I	then	applied	this	methodology	to	Deng	Xiaoping’s	writings	on	military	strategy	and	foreign	policy.	The	analysis	presents	a	nuanced	picture	of	Chinese	strategic	thought	that	is	more	in	line	with	Liu’s	view	than	Johnston’s.	Though	there	are	 realpolitik	 elements	 present,	 there	 is	 an	 overall	 orientation	 of	 defensive	 restraint.	 In	particular,	 I	 looked	at	 the	concept	of	 the	moral	man	(rencai	人才),	 the	 lynchpin	 in	Deng’s	conception	of	security.	Tracing	this	clearly	Confucian-inspired	concept	diachronically	shows	that	Confucianism’s	role	is	far	from	static.			 The	 conception	 of	 strategic	 culture	 presented	 here	 does	 not	 fit	 neatly	 into	 the	typology	presented	by	John	Glenn	(2009).	Although	I	have	very	self-consciously	drawn	from	both	Poststructuralist	and	Interpretivist	ideas	on	strategic	culture,	I	have	also	sought	to	align	my	study	with	Glenn’s	presentation	of	Constructivist	strategic	culture	scholarship	in	that	I	am	sensitive	to	the	desire	for	general	applicability.	My	model	of	strategic	culture	can	easily	be	applied	to	other	states,	using	the	same	methodologies	to	investigate	the	contours	of	other	strategic	 cultures.	 Synchronically,	 the	 focus	 could	 be	 on	 finding	 common	 strategic	vocabularies	cross-culturally.	Diachronically,	there	may	be	other	identifiable	discursive	acts	like	securitization	that	modify	the	cognitive	space	of	politics.		
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	 But	the	ultimate	goal	of	applying	the	lens	of	strategic	culture	to	China	is	to	understand	the	implications	of	China’s	rapid	rise	for	global	security.	This	study	shows	that	there	are	stark	limits	on	what	the	past	can	tell	us	about	the	present	and	future	of	Chinese	foreign	policy.	An	analysis	of	the	past	can	show	us	what	the	discourses	were,	but	assuming	they	stay	constant	is	dangerous.	If	we	look	to	Mao’s	era	to	explain	Chinese	behavior	today,	we	would	be	blind	to	the	Confucian	elements	that	reemerged	under	Deng	Xiaoping.	Looking	backward	while	moving	forward,	we	may	very	easily	fall	into	the	trap	of	essentializing	Chinese	culture	in	a	reductive,	even	Orientalist	way.		 The	integrated	view	of	strategic	culture	as	meaning-making	provides	a	way	out	of	the	trap.	Instead	of	only	looking	into	the	past,	we	can	look	to	the	present	as	well.	Culture—of	the	strategic	variety	and	otherwise—is	not	a	black	box	that	can	only	be	understood	in	retrospect.	It	 is	 an	 ongoing	 activity	 performed	 by	 living,	 breathing	 humans.	 The	 methodology	 of	predicate	 analysis	 need	 not	 only	 be	 applied	 to	 yellowed	 historical	 texts.	 By	 looking	 an	ongoing	discourse	such	as	Xi	Jinping’s	speeches	on	Sino-Japanese	relations	we	can	see	the	meanings	attached	to	China’s	policy	actions.	These	meanings	are	the	key	to	understanding	the	 intentionality	behind	 the	policies.	 It	 is	 this	 intentionality	 that	ultimately	 answers	 the	question	“What	does	the	rise	of	China	mean?”.		
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